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Martin Luther King Jr once wrote that “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”​[1]​ When a crime has been committed we hope that a fair and unbiased police investigation will follow. However, it has been noted that police investigations are susceptible to both internal and external pressures, which may influence how investigative decisions are made.​[2]​ Inadvertent and deliberate conduct by the police, such as in relation to forensic evidence, may follow the case through to the court and result in a person being found guilty for a crime they did not commit.​[3]​ Wrongful convictions are a threat to the criminal justice system, and to the society as a whole, because they underscore the fact that the criminal justice system is fallible.​[4]​

Part II outlines issues that may arise within police investigations in cases where there is no clear suspect. Research has demonstrated that under certain circumstances, police investigations may go ‘off track’, with the investigation starting to focus on one potential suspect rather than searching for the truth.​[5]​ This kind of tunnel vision has the potential to lead to what has been described as ‘case construction’.​[6]​ All emphasis is placed on finding evidence of the guilt of this one suspect, and anything which points towards their innocence is ignored, or elaborate efforts are made to minimise the importance of potentially exculpatory evidence.​[7]​ As police investigations are the starting point for building a case for a prosecution, those decisions will inevitably influence any subsequent forensic investigation and analysis.

Part III describes three cases of fatal stabbings from three different jurisdictions – Sweden, California in the US, and England. These case studies have been chosen because while they are somewhat similar in nature, i.e. fatal stabbings, the way that the police and courts dealt with them proved to be very different. The first case study is the murder of Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, which is used as an example of good practice.​[8]​ As a politician had been murdered, there was extreme media interest in the case both nationally and internationally. The investigation was thorough and successful, with a range of physical evidence pointing to the identity of the perpetrator and linking him to the crime.​[9]​ In this case there has never been any reasonable doubt that the real perpetrator was identified, convicted and sentenced for the murder. The second case study involves the murder of a young girl in her family home in southern California.​[10]​ No significant physical evidence existed in this crime, but through a substandard investigation, a man was identified as the perpetrator and convicted for the crime.​[11]​ However, in a subsequent retrial, he was found not guilty.​[12]​ The third case study involves the murder of a young female student in Bournemouth, England.​[13]​ Even though there was no physical evidence that could identify a perpetrator, a man was eventually (after three trials) convicted for the crime, in a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence from witness testimonies.​[14]​   

Part IV discusses in detail the contrasts in how these cases have been handled during the investigation and in court. Tunnel vision and case construction arguably played a part in the cases from California and England. Substandard practices within investigations, such as in relation to the handling of evidence, exacerbated the problems which contributed to these convictions. The failure to acknowledge when a lack of physical evidence is significant is also problematic. The courts need to more fully understand and appreciate this as it goes hand-in-hand with tunnel vision and case construction.

The article concludes that when police investigations go ‘off track’, the risk for tunnel vision, case construction and a wrongful conviction increases. Courts in the US and in E&W need to be more alert to substandard practices within police investigations, and acknowledge problems with case construction. In particular, caution is needed when prosecuting cases based entirely on circumstantial evidence, where the crime itself is of such a nature that it should have left physical evidence. 

II.	POLICE INVESTIGATIONS GOING ‘OFF TRACK’
It is commonplace among both professionals and academics these days to denounce media portrayals of police investigations of serious crimes as being both highly misleading and often entirely erroneous.​[15]​ Yet it is also the case that the police will often make use of potential media coverage of active investigations for their own investigative purposes.​[16]​ The exploration of the relationship between the media and the police has been subject to substantial research in recent years.​[17]​ This research is, however, a relatively recent development with former Deputy Chief Constable for Devon and Cornwall, Brian Morgan, arguing in 1990 that at least up to that point, academics had demonstrated little interest in the process of police investigation.​[18]​ 

In what might be seen, in retrospect, as a revelatory assessment made by a practicing senior officer, Morgan was to expose the significant limitations of police investigation and to highlight how, contrary to popular perception, investigations might not involve a careful search for evidence or the identification of a modus operandi.​[19]​ At this time, suspects were often seen as ‘data banks’ that, subject to police interviews, could be expected to provide both evidence of the offence and, ultimately, an admission of guilt.​[20]​ It has been argued that in the past, confession evidence was often central to clearing a case, especially in the absence of witnesses or with limited forensic evidence.​[21]​ However, in England and Wales (E&W), the value of confession evidence has to some degree declined since the introduction of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984.​[22]​ 

It has been recognised that other police strategies have arisen, that sometimes effectively replace confession evidence in the armoury of police investigation techniques. One example of this is the type of tunnel vision within an investigation which results in what is now referred to as ‘case construction’.​[23]​ There has been an increase in the use of ‘case construction’, where police investigators decide on the guilt of a suspect and view any evidence that contradicts this assumption as ‘mistaken’.​[24]​ With case construction, the primary aim becomes to prove the case against the suspect – not to test it.​[25]​ Other options will rarely be explored and the operation itself will be closed down (and handed to the prosecution) once evidence of guilt is obtained.​[26]​ Once the police are convinced of the guilt or innocence of a suspect they can be expected to ‘act decisively’.​[27]​ Although over time police investigation techniques may have improved, Morgan’s summary of police investigation of the majority of reported crime concluded that it was: “Haphazard, unsystematic, uncoordinated and managerially un-supervisable.”​[28]​ 

Moreover, in the absence of any effective and independent oversight, the integrity of the police investigation ultimately remained dependent on the professionalism of the police investigators.​[29]​ There may, however, be other factors which can play a significant part in determining the process of investigation and the potential outcome. Indeed it is interesting to note that in relation to police investigations, Morgan argued early on that the police “volunteered to be publically judged”​[30]​ on their response to crime as a measure of their effectiveness. ​[31]​ It is not surprising then, “that a considerable body of powerful opinion within the service sees the publicity of successfully solved high profile cases as a major influence on the public perception of the police function overall.”​[32]​ There are of course clear implications in adopting this assumption. For example, it may act as a motor for case construction and therefore result in wrongful convictions, as the primary aim becomes to gain a conviction, not to search for the truth.​[33]​ This matter was explored more recently by Innes who considered issues surrounding “the small number of murders that assume a very high public profile and those cases the police fail to solve.”​[34]​ Noting that ‘whodunit’ murder investigations can expect to receive both local and sometimes national media coverage, Innes confirmed that high profile cases, can acquire a “political significance for the police, media and public alike.”​[35]​ Innes goes on to add that these cases “Are effectively viewed as litmus tests of police investigative competence in dealing with serious crime” and that “The level of media and public interest in such cases and the consequent demand that the investigation be successful introduces a set of particularly intense and amplified pressures upon the enquiry team.”​[36]​ 

Innes’ research discovered that under pressure, investigations were particularly susceptible to the “mis-identification of suspects”.​[37]​ He noted these problems were particularly significant in those investigations that were under pressure by the media or other political motivations, and that those very pressures “could encourage officers to interpret any incriminating information against a suspect in accordance with their established hypothesis while ignoring possible alternative interpretations.”​[38]​ 

In effect, this ‘tunnel vision’ adopted by investigators could wholly undermine the investigation and the likelihood of identifying the real perpetrator.​[39]​ Along with this, in what might be seen as an important addition in relation to the study of police investigations in general, Innes explored ‘compliance drift’ as a potential (and real) feature within some murder investigations.​[40]​ Compliance drift involves officers making “adaptive responses to working practices that evade established procedures and regulations to reduce the pressure being experienced.”​[41]​ Moreover, because they seem to solve the perceived problem “they can become rapidly accepted and normalised by the work group.”​[42]​ Innes also argued that ‘compliance drift’ could ultimately lead to police investigators accepting that regulations and procedures “can and should be” bypassed when necessary.​[43]​ This suggests that compliance with procedure was not absolute among investigators.  Additionally, ‘compliance drift’ can also be explained by the need to ensure that an identified suspect is convicted even where the evidence based on standard investigative practices “might not support a conviction.”​[44]​

The research undertaken by Innes has served as an important reminder of the fallibility of some police investigations where the pressures, from both the police hierarchy and the media for an early arrest and conviction, can be intense.​[45]​ In these situations, the solution may occasionally be recourse to ‘police property’ where case construction and the manipulation of witnesses can ultimately provide an outcome that would be unlikely to arise from established investigative procedures.​[46]​ ‘Police property’ in this context, means individuals who are known to the police, such as low-level criminals and drug addicts that commit crimes to support their addictions.​[47]​ 

As has been seen in the US and E&W alike, when extreme flaws within police investigations are readily accepted by the prosecuting authorities and the courts and result in convictions, these are often extremely difficult to challenge. Uglow argued, in relation to the criminal justice system in E&W, that miscarriages of justice may have no single cause but an additional factor remains the subsequent unwillingness of the Court of Appeal and the Home Office “to admit that things had gone wrong.”​[48]​ Uglow further stated that 

“In aggregate these illustrate a culture of unwillingness to see its function as the uncovering of the truth and more concerned with results-arrests and convictions; a culture moreover that refused to deal with defendants with openness and fairness and that regarded recognition of such injustices as undermining the criminal justice system.”​[49]​

It is evident that the problem of tunnel vision and case construction is now potentially a greater threat to objective and open police investigations than ever before.​[50]​ As has been argued since 2005, police forces E&W have moved away from an open search for the truth, where all reasonable avenues are investigated, towards a process of building a case against an individual based on proving an hypothesis.​[51]​ In E&W it is now often the case that only evidence that supports a prosecution is entered onto the HOLMES2​[52]​ database and this exacerbates the problem. Wrongful convictions will happen when police investigations build a case around circumstances that are interpereted, sometimes quite unjustifiably, “in a way that builds a false picture of guilt.”​[53]​ This problem was identified by Bayley who argued in relation to police investigations that: “criminal investigators begin with an identification then collect the evidence – they rarely collect the evidence and then make an identification.”​[54]​





A.	THE MURDER OF ANNA LINDH, STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN
In January 2004 a high-profile murder trial commenced in Stockholm, Sweden. The man on trial was 25 year-old Mijailo Mijailović, the suspect in Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh’s fatal stabbing.​[58]​ Mijailović had a history of psychiatric problems, including violence, and had been prescribed anti-psychotic drugs and Flunitrazepam (also known as Rohypnol) by various medical professionals prior to the crime.​[59]​ Mijailović was found guilty, and received a life sentence for the murder,​[60]​ after it was determined that he was not criminally insane when he stabbed Lindh.​[61]​ 

Lindh was attacked in a department store in Stockholm during a shopping trip on September 10, 2003 and died from her injuries the following day.​[62]​ The autopsy showed that Lindh had nine open injuries, all located to the upper body, and these indicated that she had been stabbed seven or eight times.​[63]​ Although the attack itself only lasted for a brief moment,​[64]​ the forensic evidence linking Mijailović to the murder was overwhelming. 

Sweden has very high standards for crime scene investigations and the handling of evidence.​[65]​ All measures were taken to avoid contamination at the crime scene and of any associated material. Investigators wore protective clothing, and the crime scene was secured, cordoned and processed.​[66]​ Several racks of clothing around the area where Lindh was attacked were impounded for trace analysis.​[67]​ Drops of blood on the floor were analysed and they belonged to Lindh.​[68]​ Footprints were collected but were of little use as many people had been in the store.​[69]​

A witness had seen the suspect drop a knife on the escalators.​[70]​ The knife was recovered and tested positive for Lindh’s DNA.​[71]​ Although the technique was available in Sweden, other samples from the knife were sent to the much more experienced Forensic Science Service (FSS) in England for LCN DNA analysis​[72]​, which confirmed the presence of Lindh’s DNA and also identified Mijailović’s DNA.​[73]​ The knife also had green fibres on it.​[74]​  

A baseball cap was found which was believed to have been worn by the suspect as it matched CCTV images as well as witness testimonies.​[75]​ Fibres from Lindh’s jacket were found on it, and also a number of green fibres.​[76]​ It also contained male DNA which later turned out to be Mijailović’s.​[77]​ 

Lindh’s clothes had been put in a paper bag by the medics when she arrived at the hospital.​[78]​ The clothes were placed in a separate room at the police station where only a limited number of technicians were allowed access.​[79]​ Only small samples cut out from the clothes were sent to the National Forensic Laboratory to avoid possible contamination at the laboratory.​[80]​ Green fibres were found on Lindh’s jacket.​[81]​ All other evidence, such as the knife and the baseball cap, were kept in separate rooms to avoid any risk of contamination.​[82]​ 

Mijailović became a suspect after a tip-off​[83]​, and his DNA was a match to that found on the baseball cap.​[84]​ Mijailović’s mother showed the police where her son had tried to burn clothes, shoes and other items, and partially burnt clothes were collected.​[85]​ A pair of green trousers had been hidden under a rock in the same area.​[86]​ The trousers were later shown to be the source of the green fibres.​[87]​ In addition, blood stains around the right pocket were consistent with DNA from Lindh.​[88]​   

Mijailović could be linked beyond any doubt to both the crime scene (through CCTV and witness testimonies), to the murder weapon (through DNA and fibres) and to Lindh (through DNA and fibres). The police had taken utmost care to avoid any possibility of contamination.   

In 2011, Mijailović agreed to an exclusive interview with the Swedish newspaper Expressen, after keeping quiet about the crime for nearly eight years.​[89]​ He described what happened on the day of the murder, and the motives behind the attack. Mijailović explained that he hated all politicians at that time, as he blamed them for his own personal shortcomings and failures, and he recognised Anna Lindh and followed her for a short time before the attack.​[90]​ 

B.	THE MURDER OF STEPHANIE CROWE, ESCONDIDO, CALIFORNIA
Twelve year-old Stephanie Crowe was found stabbed to death in the doorway of her bedroom at around 6 am on January 21, 1998.​[91]​ Stephanie had been stabbed in her bed, but had crawled to the door before she passed out and died.​[92]​ The autopsy revealed that out of her nine stab wounds, two were fatal (one severed a major artery and the other perforated a lung), none of the wounds were below the chest, and the condition of her body indicated that she had been dead for at least six hours.​[93]​

As there were no signs of a forced entry, the police believed that the murder had been an ‘inside job’.​[94]​ It seemed highly unlikely that someone could have entered the home and carried out the murder without being detected. The front door was never used by the Crowe family and was covered in intact cobwebs, and the laundry room door, which was always used, was locked from the inside.​[95]​ The remaining door was a squeaking sliding door in the master bedroom where Stephanie’s parents were asleep throughout the night.​[96]​ 

Detectives focused on the victim’s brother, 14 year-old Michael Crowe, after noticing inconsistencies in his story about the night of the murder.​[97]​ Michael was known to feel sibling rivalry towards Stephanie and had on occasions said that he wanted to kill her.​[98]​ Michael and two of his friends, Joshua Treadway and Aaron Houser, were prosecuted for the murder after Joshua confessed to the police that he had acted as a lookout while Michael and Aaron killed Stephanie, and Michael had made damning admissions concerning his own involvement in the murder.​[99]​ The teenagers soon recanted their stories, saying that during very lengthy interrogations, they felt forced by the police to make incriminating statements.​[100]​ The police had indeed interrogated all three teenagers in sessions lasting up to ten hours,​[101]​ and a judge ruled that parts of the confessions were coerced.​[102]​ The case against the teenagers was subsequently dismissed after DNA consistent with Stephanie’s was found on a red shirt worn by a man named Richard Tuite on the day of the murder.​[103]​

Richard Tuite, a 28 year-old transient, was seen acting in what the neighbours described as a “bizarre manner”​[104]​ in the neighbourhood in the days before the murder. He knocked on doors asking for “Tracy”, a behaviour that continued after Stephanie’s murder.​[105]​ Tuite suffered from schizophrenia and had a history of crystal methamphetamine use, and had frequently been described as “a bull in a china shop” due to his clumsiness.​[106]​  

The Escondido police had briefly detained Tuite on January 21, 1998, when his clothes were impounded and he was released.​[107]​ He became the main suspect in 1999, after DNA was discovered in a reanalysis of his red shirt.​[108]​ DNA consistent with Stephanie’s was also detected on his white T-shirt in 2003, less than two months before Tuite’s trial started.​[109]​ 

Tuite’s defense focused on the confession evidence from the teenagers, the problems with a likely entry and exit point, and it raised arguments about contamination.​[110]​ A Superior Court jury convicted Tuite of voluntary manslaughter (as the threshold for murder could not be reached), and he was sentenced to 13 years in prison.​[111]​  

Looking at the many mistakes that the Escondido police made with the crime scene and evidence associated with Stephanie’s murder, it is most likely that the DNA found on Tuite’s clothing was the result of contamination. The prosecution repeatedly stated at trial that “this is a DNA case.”​[112]​ This DNA evidence consisted of (1) a one millimetre spot that contained DNA consistent with Stephanie’s, discovered on the red shirt in 1999.​[113]​ Application of fluorescein to the shirt in 1998 had not indicated the presence of blood,​[114]​ and (2) two minute smears that appeared to have shared DNA from Tuite and Stephanie, discovered on Tuite’s white T-shirt in 2003.​[115]​ Unfortunately, the samples from the white T-shirt had been consumed in the testing process.​[116]​ 

An expert on blood evidence, Brian Kennedy, stated that the spot on the red shirt “appeared to be physically altered, perhaps diluted, and looked like a dry clot.”​[117]​ In his opinion the spot was the result of a transfer, as this would be the expected pattern if dried blood came into contact with a wet fabric, or if dried blood was deposited on fabric which later became wet.​[118]​ 

Kennedy also reviewed photographs of the white T-shirt taken in 1998 and in 2003.​[119]​ When the T-shirt had been impounded, some stains on the left shoulder were circled with ink, and these stains tested positive for Tuite’s blood.​[120]​ In 2003, mirror ink marks were visible on the right shoulder.​[121]​ This transfer could only have happened if the fabric got wet or damp.​[122]​ Kennedy testified that “a water-based product could have changed the appearance of the bloodstains”​[123]​ and that “freezing and thawing a garment causes condensation that can reconstitute bloodstains and affect forensic blood analysis”.​[124]​ 

The contamination theory is arguably substantiated. There is ample evidence of substandard practices by the Escondido police at the crime scene and in the handling of evidence. 

Homicide Detective Sweeney was a possible source of contamination. He testified that he was at the crime scene and leaned over Stephanie’s body and touched her arm to see if she was cold.​[125]​ His feet were near the victim’s head. Sections of the carpet around the body were wet with blood that first day.​[126]​ Sweeney did not wear protective clothing or shoe coverings and was, in fact, in the same clothes that whole day.​[127]​ He interacted with Tuite twice that day; when Tuite was first picked up for questioning and later in the holding cell at the police station.​[128]​

Officer Christensen was another possible source of contamination. He was at the crime scene videotaping Stephanie’s blood-soaked bedroom on the first day.​[129]​ He did not wear protective clothing or shoe coverings and was in the same clothes all day.​[130]​ Christensen interacted with Tuite in the holding cell later that day.​[131]​ Tuite got undressed and handed his clothes over to Christensen, who placed each item of clothing in a separate bag.​[132]​ All these bags sat open on the concrete floor before they were sealed.​[133]​ 

Moreover, transfer was known to have occurred at least once. An evidence technician stepped in Stephanie’s blood and transferred a bloody footprint onto a piece of notebook paper in Stephanie’s bedroom.​[134]​ Another person knelt on the floor and got Stephanie’s blood on his knee.​[135]​ Several officers who had been at the crime scene without protective clothing or shoe coverings also walked into the holding cell when Tuite was present.​[136]​ 

A tripod and rulers were possible sources of contamination. The Police Department only had one tripod and it was used for multiple purposes, including at the crime scene and to photograph evidence at the station.​[137]​ Protective coverings were never used on the legs of the tripod.​[138]​ Kennedy stated that dried blood on the foot of a tripod could have transferred onto a piece of clothing without directly contacting it.​[139]​ Rulers were also used in multiple locations and for multiple purposes.​[140]​

The crime scene was overcrowded, especially during the first day of the investigation. The family, the fire fighters who responded to the 911 call, numerous police officers, detectives and crime scene technicians and a medical examiner were in the house.​[141]​ The forensic work in the house continued for several weeks, with many people entering and leaving every day.​[142]​  

 The Police Department did not have enough storage facilities for the evidence. A large metal shipping container was bought for storage.​[143]​ This container was placed in the police station’s parking lot. The container got extremely hot inside.​[144]​ Without any exaggeration it can be said that the police department truly failed in storing vital evidence properly. The red shirt had been in this container, whereas the white T-shirt had been in a freezer elsewhere.​[145]​ In addition, evidence was taken out and put back in storage many times to be viewed and processed, including Tuite’s clothes.​[146]​ When viewing some of this evidence, a folding table would be set up in the parking lot outside the container.​[147]​

Despite spending over 600 hours, over a period of two years, on the examination of trace evidence from the crime scene, the laboratory could not find anything that connected Tuite to the house.​[148]​ Fingernail scrapings taken when Tuite was first detained did not contain anything of interest either,​[149]​ despite the fact that his unkempt appearance indicated that he had not showered properly in a while.​[150]​ This seems to contradict the prosecution’s theory that Tuite would have been able to get into the house undetected, despite seven family members being present in the house, and hidden for several hours before killing Stephanie and leaving the house undetected.

Apart from the spots of DNA on his shirts there was nothing that could link Tuite to Stephanie or the crime scene. However, it is well documented that protective clothing or shoe coverings were not used when working on the crime scene, and equipment was used at multiple locations and for multiple purposes without being protected from contamination. 

Tuite appealed his conviction, stating that the cumulative effect of errors had rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and violated his right to due process.​[151]​ The appeal court disagreed and stated that they had only found one clear error, a limitation on a cross-examination of an expert witness, but cited that it was a harmless error.​[152]​ The court further stated even assuming there were other errors, “any so-called cumulative error was harmless even under the most exacting standard of review.”​[153]​ 

Tuite’s conviction was finally voided by a federal appeals court in 2012 and a retrial was ordered.​[154]​ A retrial on involuntary manslaughter charges commenced in 2013, and Tuite was found not guilty on December 6, 2013.​[155]​ After the acquittal, Tuite’s attorney pointed to two main reasons for the verdict; the fact that Tuite could not be placed near the Crowe residence the night of the killing, and that it was impossible for Tuite to get in through a door that was deadlocked.​[156]​ The jury had also heard detailed evidence that made a strong case for the theory that the very minute specks of blood and DNA (half of which could never be retested as the sample was consumed during the testing) were the result of contamination.​[157]​   

C.	THE MURDER OF OKI SHIN, BOURNEMOUTH, ENGLAND
This case began in July 2002 when a young Korean language student, Jong-Ok ‘Oki’ Shin, was attacked in the early hours of the morning of July 12, when walking home along Malmesbury Park Road, close to the Charminster Road in Bournemouth, England.​[158]​ Oki was the only witness to the attack, and before losing consciousness in hospital, stated that she had been attacked from behind by a man “wearing a mask.”​[159]​ Sadly, she later passed away from blood loss without regaining consciousness.​[160]​

Forensic investigations revealed no evidence that the attack had been sexually motivated,​[161]​ and nothing had been stolen as Oki’s mobile phone and hand-bag were still at the crime scene.​[162]​ Initial police interest was directed very clearly towards the Korean student community and a number of Oki’s fellow students were interviewed.​[163]​ After six weeks of fruitless police investigations, the Korean Embassy in London voiced grave concerns about the vulnerability of Korean students in Bournemouth.​[164]​ It was at this point that Omar Benguit became a person of interest in the investigation of Oki’s murder.

This development arose entirely from statements made by Beverley Brown (who along with Benguit was a heavy drug user), to the police about events that occurred during the night of the murder.​[165]​ In a detailed statement, she claimed that whilst driving her Volvo car on the Charminster Road that evening, she was flagged down by three men who wanted a lift to a crack-house located some distance away.​[166]​ Beverley named the men as Omar Benguit, Nick Gbadamosi and Darius Woolry. As they drove away she claimed that they saw Oki and that Benguit made a comment about Oki of a sexual nature, and then demanded her to stop the car so that he and Gbadamosi could get out and talk to Oki.​[167]​ Beverley further claimed that upon returning to the car, Gbadamosi angrily claimed that Benguit had made a mistake and “hurt her”​[168]​ presumably in the process of taking her purse or handbag for money to buy drugs.​[169]​ 

Beverley further alleged that upon returning to the car, Benguit had blood all over his hands and clothes and that the men wanted to dispose of Benguit’s bloody clothes.​[170]​ She claimed that Gbadamosi put the clothes in a bag which he dumped in the River Stour.​[171]​ After reaching the crack-house, Benguit had washed his hands of the blood.​[172]​ Beverley stated that they got back into the car, and she was ordered to drive to a location outside the city where Benguit and Gbadamosi subjected her to a serious sexual assault, in which they used a variety of tools from the car tool box to sexually assault her.​[173]​ It is very important to note that Beverley named both men in relation to this vicious sexual assault, and she claimed that Gbadamosi said to her that “she wants this.”​[174]​ She further stated that the same knife that was used to murder Oki was used to “slice her stomach” during the assault.​[175]​ 

Despite what might be seen as a plethora of potential physical evidence arising from both the attack on Oki and the vicious rape of Beverley,​[176]​ the subsequent forensic investigations revealed no evidence to link either Benguit or Gbadamosi to these attacks.​[177]​ The car used by Beverley, along with the tool box, provided no DNA or other evidence linking the men with the attacks.​[178]​ The forensic scientist who examined the jacket worn by Benguit on the night of the murder​[179]​ had found “no components of the deceased’s DNA in any of the samples of blood found on the jacket.”​[180]​ Similarly, the forensic investigators could not find anything to link Benguit to the car driven by Beverley Brown that night, and there was no evidence of the other two original defendants ever having been in her car either.​[181]​ The bundle of clothes in a plastic bag which Beverley alleged had been thrown into a river was never found, despite searches.​[182]​

CCTV footage of Charminster Road at the times identified by Beverley revealed that no vehicle of the make used by Beverley had been recorded on the tapes.​[183]​ It was also discovered that Beverley’s belated decision to make her witness statement to the police coincided with her own arrest for shoplifting,​[184]​ and there were indications that she had received a financial reward for providing material evidence leading to the conviction of Benguit.​[185]​ 

Just how tenuous Beverley’s detailed account of events proved to be was demonstrated in court when Gbadamosi’s defense counsel presented CCTV footage that showed Gbadamosi driving his car at a point miles away from the crime scene, at the very time Beverley claimed he was involved in the murder and her rape.​[186]​ Subsequently, both Benguit and Gbadamosi were acquitted of the rape charges.​[187]​ 

However, only Gbadamosi was released from custody whereas Benguit was retried for murder.​[188]​ In all it took three trials, and a special permission from the Director of Public Prosecutions, to even allow for a third trial to take place,​[189]​ to have Benguit found guilty for the murder of Oki. The oppressive nature of the prosecutions of Benguit becomes very clear. In the absence of any scientific evidence directly linking Benguit to the murder of Oki, all three prosecutions were based entirely on circumstantial evidence from highly questionable witnesses.​[190]​ 

Former acquaintances of Benguit, and like him heavy drug users, stated that Benguit regularly carried a knife.​[191]​ A Mr Cutting, who claimed to live in the same house as Benguit, stated at the third trial that he thought he had once seen Benguit out the window of his first floor flat “sharpening a blade.”​[192]​ This witness statement, though providing merely circumstantial evidence, may have been influential in persuading the jury that Benguit had indeed committed the murder.​[193]​ 

Apart from the testimonies by Beverley and a group of other drug users, there was simply no evidence to implicate Benguit in the murder.​[194]​ Indeed, it appeared that the lack of evidence contradicted the testimonies which had been given. Nevertheless, Benguit was convicted in 2005 and received a life sentence with a 20 year minimum for Oki’s murder.​[195]​ 

In 2014, Benguit’s case went before the Court of Appeal Criminal Division (CACD) and the CACD rejected the appeal on grounds that appear difficult to sustain.​[196]​ While the court agreed that Beverley Brown had exaggerated her account to the police and jury, she did not “exaggerate for monetary gain”​[197]​ and her credibility was also “fully explored before the jury.”​[198]​ The Crown Court’s acceptance of the evidence presented by Beverley was not questioned by the CACD,​[199]​ even though Beverley’s rape allegations proved to be nothing but extravagant fantasy.  Beverley Brown had lied by implicating Gbadamosi in the murder of Oki and the subsequent rape.​[200]​ What real value could be accorded to a witness whose account was undermined by CCTV evidence which placed one of the two alleged culprits miles away from the crimes?  

The CACD also stated that “the Crown could point to significant circumstantial support”​[201]​  for Beverley’s account from the other witnesses who provided testimonies.​[202]​ However, despite all of them (inlcuding Beverley) being heavy drug users, they demonstrated a memory recall unexampled among this category of people.​[203]​ This could suggest that they were “coached” before the third trial.​[204]​  

In addition, the CACD had no issue with the fact that Beverley had changed her mind about the make of car she was driving on the night of the murder, suggesting two different cars of different makes, or the lack of any physical evidence linking Benguit or the others to the cars.​[205]​ On the contrary, in the appeal, the two experts’ failure to conclusively identify either of these cars on CCTV at the relevant times (between 02:30 and 03:05) was simply disposed of as neither excluded the cars.​[206]​ 

The CACD continued to support the evident fantasies of a witness who, despite being a protected witness, later went on a popular daytime TV show, the Jeremy Kyle Show, where she claimed to have witnessed the murder.​[207]​ This contradicted the testimony she had given at trial, where she stated that although she sat in the car and heard the knife go through Oki’s body with such force that it struck the pavement,​[208]​ she never actually saw the murder.​[209]​ Forensic evidence indicated that Oki was attacked in a standing position and Beverley had been unable to identify the right location in the road where the attack had taken place.​[210]​    
 
It might be thought that in a case which depended so heavily on circumstantial evidence from highly questionable group of people, there would be some room for doubt. This was not considered by the CACD at all, despite the CACD noting that “Searches and science did not link Benguit to the murder.”​[211]​ As Benguit failed his appeal, he still remains in a category A prison and maintains that he is innocent of the crime.  

IV.	DISCUSSION
Garrett’s comprehensive 2011 study of 250 US innocence cases​[212]​ shows that there are some doubts around the concept of innocent until proven guilty. Garrett’s study covers exonerations through post-conviction DNA, and it must be borne in mind that DNA is not available in every example of a suspected wrongful conviction. However, the study still shows a frightening trend, where there seems be a shift from a presumption of innocence to a more robust approach of guilty until 100% exonerated through science. This is problematic in itself as science is not infallible. This is particularly true as genuine human error, sloppy police work, poorly maintained crime scenes and questionable criminal justice procedures are also part of the picture. Similar studies have not taken place in E&W or in Sweden. However, the figures are useful for comparative purposes, especially in relation to the E&W, as the adversarial systems are similar in those two jurisdictions.

Garrett’s study shows that the types of evidence most frequently supporting an innocent appellant’s original conviction were: eyewitnesses 76% (190 cases); forensic evidence 74% (185 cases); informant testimony 21% (52 cases); and confessions 16% (40 cases).​[213]​ It would appear that it is during the investigatory phase that a lot of associated problems occur, and this poor evidence is then admitted into the courts. For example, in relation to eyewitness testimonies, substandard police procedures can be blamed, and the same is true for informant testimony and confession evidence​[214]​. However, there may also be a link between a police investigation and questionable forensic evidence, as financial pressures might mean that only a fraction of the evidence from a crime scene will be tested; that which has been deemed to have the highest probative value. 

Looking at the case studies described in Part III we can determine the following:

	The Anna Lindh murder: a conviction based on physical evidence (DNA, fibres, blood), CCTV images, and witness testimonies. This appears to be a solid conviction and was confirmed in an interview by the assailant, Mijailo Mijailović, eight years after the conviction, when he explained what had happened on the day of the murder and why he attacked the Swedish Foreign Minister. 

	The Stephanie Crowe murder: Tuite’s original conviction was based on minute specks of DNA which were likely the result of contamination through poor, substandard practices. The conviction was eventually voided and in a retrial Tuite was found not guilty. There was no other scientific evidence to put him at the crime scene or link him to the victim, there were no witnesses that could place him sufficiently close to the crime scene, and the fact remains that the only possible entrance point was a door deadlocked from the inside.    

	The Oki Shin murder: Beverly Brown can be descried as something between an unreliable eyewitness and an informant. There is no physical evidence which support her, or any of the other drug addicts’ testimonies. If fact, the lack of forensic evidence contradicts the stories told by these witnesses. There is no physical evidence which links Benguit to the victim or the crime scene, or to the car he was allegedly travelling in whilst covered in blood. Benguit’s clothes were confiscated and tested, and nothing can link him forensically to the crime, other than the testimonies from drug addicts. 

In the US, the favoured mathematical level of guilt is thought to be more than a 90% certainty, but empirical studies show that jurors require as little as 70% to meet this burden.​[215]​ Therefore it comes as no surprise that “empirical evidence suggests prosecutors typically obtain convictions on less than a reasonable doubt.”​[216]​ When there is high pressure on the police and the prosecution to obtain a conviction, there is an increased risk of tunnel vision and case construction. Unreliable witnesses and/or questionable, flimsy scientific evidence, become central to the prosecution’s case, as was clearly demonstrated in Garrett’s study.​[217]​ 

A.	TUNNEL VISION, CASE CONSTRUCTION, AND ‘POLICE PROPERTY’
Looking at the case studies, there are some striking similarities between the investigations which resulted in the convictions of Tuite and Benguit. People with mental health issues or significant personal problems, such as drug addiction, are vulnerable in the hands of an unprofessional police investigation as they may not have the capabilities to effectively challenge what investigators claim that they have done. This may be due to issues with mental health, intellectual impairment, or memory impairment due to drug use.​[218]​ Tuite suffered from schizophrenia and had been using drugs in the past, and Benguit was a heavy drug user at the time that the crime took place.

The timing of Tuite and Benguit becoming suspects is of importance. In Tuite’s case, the murder investigation had followed an entirely different track originally, resulting in a trial of three other suspects.​[219]​ The trial collapsed after the court became aware that the three suspects had been interrogated in lengthy sessions, claiming that they were coerced by the investigators to make admissions of guilt.​[220]​ The police was put in a precarious position, with significant negative attention in the media, and there was immense pressure to ‘fix’ the situation. The finding of incriminating evidence pointing to Tuite’s guilt coincided with the collapse of the trial against the three original suspects.​[221]​ The minute specks of DNA found on Tuite’s red shirt created tunnel vision that led to case construction. This is particularly true as the court in the original trial had shown that the interview evidence against the three other suspects could not be used in court, so this line of enquiry was effectively shut down.​[222]​ In summary, a case was constructed against Tuite, where anything which pointed away from his guilt was ignored, excluded or elaborate explanations were offered to minimise the effect of such evidence.  

Benguit only became a suspect after there had been significant attention in the local media, where the police had been criticised for not being able to solve the murder.​[223]​ This was coupled with increasing pressures from Korean authorities, which must have become a serious problem as Bournemouth’s economy is dependent on language schools and general tourism. The initial evidence against Benguit was provided by Beverley Brown, who was known to the police as a result of her shop lifting activities, drug use and part-time prostitution.​[224]​ Benguit was also a drug user and known to the police.​[225]​ However, quite unlike Beverley who appeared able to recall very detailed events about the night of July 11, 2002, Benguit was unable to recall his exact whereabouts for some of that evening.​[226]​ With Benguit unable to challenge the police’s hypothesis, which was based entirely on Beverley’s statements,​[227]​ he became an easy target. Beverley’s statements led to tunnel vision, where all emphasis was on Benguit and any alternative enquiries were closed down. ​[228]​  

The term ‘police property’ has been used to describe individuals who are known to the police, as they can become the object of often arbitrary police intervention. Reiner has defined police property as   

“low status, powerless groups, whom the dominant majority see as problematic or distasteful. The majority are prepared to let the police deal with ‘their property’ and turn a blind eye to the manner in which this is done. Examples would be vagrants, skid row alcoholics, the unemployed or casually employed residuum.”​[229]​ 

Reiner further stated that “the prime function of the police has always been to control and segregate such groups and they are armed with a battery of permissive and discretionary laws for this purpose.”​[230]​ Beverley and Benguit can be seen as police property, and they were both used by the police for different purposes. As a result of the stories Beverley told the police, she was put into a witness protection scheme.​[231]​ Beverley complained about many off duty visits made by police officers to her protective residence, and this was investigated by the Dorset Police Complaints and Discipline Department.​[232]​ This may suggest that the police were, in fact, using Beverley in their case construction. Benguit was to pay a very high price for that as he was eventually convicted based on purely circumstantial evidence.​[233]​  Benguit’s conviction demonstrates that police property can be seen to have a significant role in major police investigations, where established police investigation procedures were leading nowhere.​[234]​

The convictions of Tuite and Benguit respectively appear to have placated both the media and the public at the time, as a suspect had been identified and the murder investigations could be closed. 

B.	LOCARD’S EXCHANGE PRINCIPLE AND CONTAMINATION: SWEDEN V. CALIFORNIA
Forensic science, or the “application of science to the justice system”,​[235]​ is a discipline which in its current form can be traced back to groundbreaking work carried out in Europe in the early twentieth century. Dr Edmond Locard, by many regarded as “perhaps the most important forensic scientist of the century”,​[236]​ was responsible for many of these developments.​[237]​ The most outstanding contribution is perhaps what is commonly referred to as ‘Locard’s Exchange Principle’, based on his understanding that whenever two objects meet there is an exchange of material from each to the other.​[238]​ In a criminal context, this was a major breakthrough as evidence could link a perpetrator to a victim and a crime scene and vice versa. Locard fully understood the importance of evidence integrity and repeatedly stated the need to protect the crime scene (or subject) from having further material added to it, which in turn could lead to the evidence being lost due to degradation or obliteration; this is today referred to as contamination​[239]​. 

The importance of avoiding contamination of the crime scene and of any physical evidence cannot be overstated. Contamination has been defined as “to soil, stain, corrupt or infect by contact or association”, “to make impure or unclean.”​[240]​ With that definition in mind it becomes obvious that contamination of physical evidence can occur at any time during a criminal investigation: at the crime scene; during collection, packaging and transportation of evidence to another location; whilst evidence is in storage; and during the actual analysis of evidence in a laboratory. Every time the evidence is handled there is a new potential risk.

The risk of contamination increases tremendously if protective clothing is not worn when processing and documenting a crime scene, and if equipment such as rulers, cameras and tripods are used at multiple locations and for multiple purposes. Examples include at a crime scene as well as in a laboratory, and in association with both a victim and a potential suspect. The risk is further increased if a crime scene is overcrowded, as the integrity of the crime scene is compromised with every new person entering and leaving the scene.

Sweden has a very long tradition of crime scene investigations,​[241]​ and a standardized approach has been adopted. Training for crime scene personnel is centralized and substantial and it takes many years to qualify.​[242]​ Measures are taken to ensure that all personnel have high levels of knowledge and education. The risk of contamination is an issue that everyone working within the police is informed about early on in their training. Responding police officers, who may be the first to arrive at a crime scene, and the crime scene investigators, abide by the same guidelines. One of these is to avoid contamination, which can be seen prominently displayed under the title Avoid Contamination on page 4 in the main field manual of crime scene investigation used in Sweden,​[243]​ which reads: 

“When two objects come into contact with each other there is always an exchange of materials between them. In fact, sometimes the objects do not even have to be in contact, since materials such as fibres are suspended in the air. This type of material exchange – contamination - must be avoided throughout the material handling chain, from collection at the crime scene to the examination in the laboratory. Apart from the instructions in the checklists, the following rules should be followed to avoid contamination:  

	Never let suspects and victims be in the same room or be transported in the same car, not even at different times.
	Use protective clothing (overalls, caps, gloves and disposable shoe coverings) when entering a crime scene and collecting trace evidence (hair, fibres, blood, secretions, small particles etc.).
	One person should carry out the crime scene investigation, another should examine the suspect’s clothes, car etc., a third the suspect himself, a fourth the victim etc.
	Cars should preferably be examined on site.
	If a car must be moved, it should be towed. Avoid using the seats. If that is unavoidable, use protective clothing. If the car must be driven, the only person in it should be the driver, who should wear protective clothing. A list of the clothes worn by the driver should be given to the investigating officer.” ​[244]​
    
The risk of contamination has been known for approximately 100 years​[245]​, so it is inexcusable to fail to protect against that risk. Why were there such differences between Sweden and California? 

Although the murder of Stephanie Crowe took place in 1998, and that of Anna Lindh in 2003, the earlier date is no excuse for the substandard work carried out by the Escondido police. DNA had, at the time, already been used as evidence in criminal trials in the US for a decade,​[246]​ and law enforcement personnel were fully aware of issues relating to contamination after the highly publicised 1995 trial and acquittal of O.J. Simpson.​[247]​ 

Maybe one reason is that, in Sweden, there is a standardized approach. If the Swedish guidelines outlined above had been applied by the Escondido Police in the Stephanie Crowe murder, the risk of contamination would have been significantly limited. In the US there is no standardized approach, as there are differences between federal and state jurisdictions, and not even uniformity at state level.​[248]​ Measures such as the Coverdell National Forensic Science Improvement Grants Program aim to improve forensic work carried out in laboratories in the US.​[249]​ However, it can be argued that it does not matter how good the laboratories are if the problem starts already at the crime scene, or during evidence handling, by not adequately protecting samples from contamination.​[250]​ Some money would be better spent on providing police departments with an endless supply of protective clothing, additional equipment and so on.  

As seen in Part III, there were numerous opportunities for contamination to occur in the Stephanie Crowe murder.​[251]​ The timing of the discovery of evidence which incriminated Tuite was ‘perfect’, as it coincided with the collapse of the case against Stephanie’s brother and his friends.​[252]​ It also resulted in the police investigation going off track, as it caused tunnel vision and case construction. Tuite, with his mental health issues and transient lifestyle, did not stand a chance when the heavy machinery of justice came down on him. 

C.	THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LACK OF ANY PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
When comparing the three cases, it is remarkable that the police in the Oki Shin murder investigation managed to put together a case that was strong enough to be accepted for prosecution (three times). Kirk stated that “Physical evidence cannot be wrong, it cannot perjure itself, it cannot be wholly absent. Only its interpretation can err.”​[253]​ There are circumstances and situations where physical evidence may not be found, for example where existing material has degraded or been destroyed by forces such as fire. Criminals may also try to avoid leaving evidence behind, for example by wearing gloves. However, this would not appear to be the case in any of the three case studies, as no witness testimonies indicate that Mijailović, Tuite or Benguit were wearing anything other than regular clothing during the time of the crimes. 

The fatal stabbings of Anna Lindh and Oki Shin were similar in that they were unprovoked attacks that were over quickly. Nevertheless, there was an abundance of physical evidence tying Mijailović to the crime scene, the victim and the murder weapon despite the fact that Mijailović had done his utmost to destroy the evidence.​[254]​ The failure to find any physical evidence to connect Benguit to the crime is extraordinary as, in accordance with witness testimonies, such evidence (especially blood) should, at the very least, have been possible to detect on Benguit’s clothing as well as in the car that he allegedly travelled in that night. The CACD itself had to admit that, “Searches and science did not link Benguit to the murder.”​[255]​ It cannot be established by anything other than Beverley’s testimonies (which changed over time) that Benguit was in her car or anywhere near the crime scene. In addition, testimonies about Benguit carrying a knife,​[256]​ and that this somehow proved that he murdered Oki would appear to border on the ludicrous. Such interpretations do provide a perfect example of the dangerous generalizations that leading textbooks on evidence warn about,​[257]​ as the majority of people who carry knives do not use them to carry out fatal stabbings. It has not been proven that Benguit carried a knife on the night of Oki’s death, or if he did, that this was in fact the murder weapon.​[258]​ As the murder weapon has never been recovered, it was difficult for Benguit’s defense to dispute the prosecution witnesses.  

The inexplicable absence of any physical evidence linking Benguit to the murder contradicts the circumstantial evidence from the witness testimonies that formed the basis of his conviction. It is therefore very unfortunate that despite this central weakness, the CACD believed that there was “significant circumstantial support” for Benguit’s conviction in his 2014 appeal. The fact that no physical evidence has ever been found to link Benguit to the murder, even though this is a crime where such evidence could be expected, is significant and needs to be fully explored within the context of a further appeal.  

V.	CONCLUSION
This article has explored how tunnel vision and case construction lead to ‘off track’ police investigations. Research by Reiner,​[259]​ Morgan,​[260]​ Innes​[261]​ and Bayley​[262]​ provided useful definitions, explanations and insights into the problems associated with these issues. Although these authors focused mainly on E&W, the phenomenon has also been documented in the US by Findley & Scott,​[263]​ in relation to wrongful convictions. The research outlined in Part II suggested that police investigations are particularly susceptible to problems such as case construction where the police investigation team were subject to both internal and external pressures. In difficult cases where there is no clear suspect, or where the main suspect cannot be charged for one reason or another, there is an increased risk of trying to ‘fix the problem’. 

Three fatal stabbings, from three different jurisdictions, were analysed in Part III in order to illustrate problems relating to, in particular, case construction and flawed forensic practices. The case studies included the murder of Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, which provided an example of good practice, as the police investigation and any associated forensic work was carried out to a high standard and a successful conviction was achieved. In the second case study, the murder of Stephanie Crowe in Southern California, serious issues with the police investigation, the crime scene and forensic evidence were highlighted. The third case study, the murder of Oki Shin in England, provided an example of tunnel vision and case construction and showed how a conviction was achieved purely based on circumstantial evidence.

Part IV examined some specific problems relating to ‘off track’ police investigations, which had been identified in the three case studies. Similarities were detected in the convictions of Tuite and Benguit. Both men were known to the police and would fit the definition of “police property” as described by Reiner.​[264]​ Both murder investigations had experienced difficulties, and through tunnel vision and case construction cases were built against these men. Tuite was eventually acquitted in a retrial, whereas Benguit’s 2014 appeal was rejected and he remains in prison. When comparing the Stephanie Crowe and Anna Lindh murder investigations, it became apparent that substandard and flawed forensic practices had caused contamination of evidence in the Stephanie Crowe case. This contaminated evidence was the only physical evidence that could link Tuite to the crime. If Swedish guidelines to avoid contamination had been followed, it is very unlikely that Tuite would ever have been prosecuted. When comparing the Oki Shin and Anna Lindh murder investigations, there was a whole range of forensic evidence linking Mijailović to Anna Lindh’s murder. This was not the case in the Oki Shin murder, as Benguit was convicted based on circumstantial evidence alone after a number of different forensic investigations had failed to link him to the murder. It is remarkable that the trial and appeal courts failed to acknowledge the significance of the lack of physical evidence, as this contradicted the testimonies that made up the circumstantial case against Benguit. 
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